When reliance on gas fired lighting, building design flaws and no way hundreds of people can escape from a fire led to disaster
What happened?
On 5th September 1887, a fire broke out in the backstage area of the Theatre Royal in Exeter. 186 people died from the smoke and flames, crushing and trampling, and trauma injuries from falling or jumping from the roof and balconies.
Most of the dead were in the gallery of the theatre, which had only a single exit with several design flaws.
There had been a licensing inspection prior to the fire, when the magistrates noted several deficiencies, which were ordered to be rectified. These included installing an additional exit for the audience. While these requirements were very detailed, any system to ensure their implementation was less robust, and the improvements did not happen.
The licensing requirements also specified the provision of an iron safety curtain, but this was not fitted at the time of the fire either.
There were between seven and eight hundred people in the theatre at the time of the fire, with some three hundred people in the gallery alone, boosted by an influx of “half-timers” who entered after 9.00 pm for a cheaper seat.
The fire broke out when a gauze curtain was caught alight by one of the gas jets used for stage lighting. The scene-shifter then released the “drop-scene” (a painting of Warwick Castle) towards the front of the stage, temporarily isolating the fire from the auditorium, and before the audience had noticed anything wrong.
The cast and crew escaped, opening the stage doors, providing a draft that fanned the flames, and caused the drop scene to first bulge out, and then ignite.
Because the fire had been ignited by a gas lamp, the gas valves were shut off, but due to a further design flaw in the building, the shut-off cut the gas to all lighting in the building. This meant that the audience trying to escape were plunged into darkness, and with the thick smoke visibility was severely restricted.
Legal Outcome
An inquest was held, and the verdict was accidental death. Prosecutions against the architect and theatre operator were attempted, but for various reasons the charges were dismissed.
What can we learn from what happened?
While the initial cause of the fire was very straight forward (gas lamp igniting a gauze curtain), the cause of the fire’s spread was complicated by various design flaws.
An outcome of this tragedy was the mandatory use of a safety curtain. They had existed before the Exeter Theatre fire, as referenced in the licensing requirements (although not installed), but their use was rare. When you go to the theatre now, you will see the safety curtain in action, and while you could argue that the massive improvements to theatre design enabling theatre goers to escape in the event of a fire makes it less valuable than in the 1880s, you can reflect on the massive loss of life in Devon as the event that brought about its use.
Source of Information
Wikipedia