When a plant room error led to a flume operation error which led to an accident
What happened?
A twelve year-old boy was the first rider of the flume at a leisure centre operated by a charitable trust. He slid down the flume and collided with the end of the catchpool, fracturing his right ankle and shinbone. There was insufficient water to slow him down.
There were three flumes at the leisure centre. On the day of the incident, the pool plant operator was later than normal starting up the three flumes, as she was dealing with other matters, and she mistakenly closed the water-flow valve instead of opening it as she intended.
The lifeguard stationed at the bottom of the flume contacted the pool plant operator to say no water had come through. The operator went to investigate and discovered the valve was closed, and so opened it.
As the water had now begun to flow at the top, the lifeguards at the top were unaware of the problem at the bottom of the ride and allowed the boy to slide down the flume. The lifeguard at the bottom called colleagues at the top to warn them not to send anyone down, but as he picked up the phone he heard the noise of the boy hitting the end of the catchpool.
An HSE investigation found that the charitable trust had failed to control risks fully and provide a safe system of work. The trust’s pool-safety operating procedure did not include a procedure, in which staff were trained, for checking and verifying the water levels in the flume and catchpool before it was used by members of the public.
Following the incident, the trust added this procedure and produced an action plan to ensure flumes are running for 30 minutes before riders are allowed on. The trust also made improvements to its communication system to check water flow and depth, and conducted a thorough review of its training provision.
Legal Outcome
The charitable trust was fined £8000 after pleading guilty to breaching s3(1) of the HSWA 1974. The HSE inspector said the incident was “entirely foreseeable and preventable”, adding: “While riding on any waterslide is not risk-free — this type of incident fell well outside the acceptable risk that customers accept by using such equipment.
What can we learn from what happened?
This accident happened because of a combination of errors that compounded each other.
Had the flume been checked for correct operation before the first rider descended, then the plant room error would not have been so relevant. While running the flume for thirty minutes before use seems a little excessive, ensuring the lifeguards know why the water flow in the catchpool is so important, and then ensuring effective communication between top and bottom of the flume, and ideally also the duty manager, would have prevented what could have been a far more serious accident. This may not be easy to achieve – lots of young staff to be trained and supervised, but essential nevertheless.
Source of Information
SHP In-Court